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The Case of Vietnam*
1. Introduction
As a result of the second Indochina War, the former market-oriented
South Vietnam underwent a "socialist transformation" in the course of the
reunification with North Vietnam (1976). In consequence, average per
capita incomes declined in the late seventies. Economic growth could be
restored in the early eighties with the large financial aid of the Soviet
Union only. In 1986, after almost a decade of reform tinkering the
Vietnamese government announced a broad stepwise liberalization of the
.centrally planned economy. The plan comprised a reform of the
microeconcfnic incentive structure, an export-oriented development
strategy and a stabilization program, which was initiated in early 1989.
1
The urgent task for Vietnam in the late eighties was to control the high
inflation, which had been running at an annual rate of several hundred
percent since 1985, and at the same time to recover economic growth.
The inflation was caused by persistently high budget deficits, which were
to a large part financed by currency issue. The banking system was not
able to enforce credit discipline, since this would have interfered with the
plan fulfilment of public enterprises. The 1989 stabilization plan comprised
a drastic cut in public expenditures and a restrictive monetary policy, but
the fiscal reform component has been delayed until 1991. Nevertheless,
inflation came to a standstill in the first half of 1989, and the price level
increased by only 35% in the whole of 1989. In the next two years
inflation regained momentum, but decreased even further to 15% in 1992.
This rapid disinflation was not accompanied by a sharp decline in real
production and employment, which has been a typical by-product of many
stabilization attempts in developing countries. The large lay-offs in the
public sector were compensated by increasing employment in the private
and collective sector. In 1989-1991, per capita national income remained
fairly stable in real terms, and in 1992 economic growth recovered.
* This paper is part of a research project on macroeconomic aspects of the
transformation process in Vietnam; financial support of the Volkswagen-
Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.
1 For a summary of the Vietnamese reform program see Diehl (1993).This paper attempts to explain the apparent success story of the
Vietnamese stabilization since 1989. Section 2 reviews the theoretical
background of disinflation programs, contrasting shock approach and
gradualism. Section 3 identifies the key elements of the Vietnamese
reform with respect to the credibility of stabilization efforts and to the
sequencing of liberalization measures. In Section 4 a monetary model of
hyperinflation with two equilibria is presented to explain the stabilization
experience of Vietnam. The evidence for Vietnam supports the hypothesis
that a sudden decrease of actual and expected inflation rates can be
achieved in spite of a postponed fiscal adjustment if significant
liberalization measures are introduced in an early stage of system
transformation to avoid unnecessary output losses.
2. Theoretical Aspects of Disinflation Programs
Since 1989 most of the socialist economies in transition have attempted
to put in place a stabilization program. When examining the effects of the
reform programs substantial differences can be easily noticed, especially
with respect to the speed of stabilization and the sequencing of
liberalization measures (Kolodko et al., 1992). Based on the experience in
developing countries (e.g. Bruno et al., 1991) important criteria for
success or failure of stabilization programs can be identified. These
considerations can be used as analytical foundation for a first attempt to
explain the success of the 1989 Vietnamese stabilization program. For
this reason, some characteristics of the Vietnamese economy are
mentioned in this section to illustrate the respective theoretical argument.
In general, there is no dissent about the real costs of high and erratic
inflation rates (Fischer, Modigliani, 1978). First, the informational content
of price changes is reduced. In an inflationary environment, it is difficult to
discriminate between absolute and relative price changes. Therefore,
resources are not allocated to optimal production possibilities. This effect
is even stronger in economies with a high degree of state-administered
prices, e.g. in centrally planned economies. Second, domestic investment
is discouraged for the same reason, since the investment risk increases
because reliable rates of return can hardly be calculated. This leads to a
portfolio shift in favour of low risk assets with relatively low rates of return,
e.g. real estate, gold or consumer durables, and hence to lower income
growth rates. Third, government tax revenues are shrinking in real terms
due to delayed tax payments (Oliveira-Tanzi-effect). The governmentpushes inflation rates even higher, if it resorts to currency issue to finance
the budget deficit ("inflation tax") and thereby loses its reputation.
For these reasons, a stabilization program is necessary to recover real
income growth and to ease structural adjustment. Especially for socialist
economies in transition, structural changes are unavoidable in order to
gain from an efficient allocation of domestic resources and from
international trade. Persistently high inflation rates are always caused by
the lack of monetary discipline, especially with respect to currency issue
to finance the budget deficits. In the late eighties money creation for the
Vietnamese budget deficit ranged between 5 and 10 per cent of the
national income. Therefore, there is no doubt about the basic measures to
reach sustainable low inflation rates: a fiscal reform to reduce the budget
deficits and a^ tight credit policy. Opinions differ, however, how a rapid
disinflation can be achieved without major costs in terms of
unemployment and real production losses. Since private agents not only
react to present price signals but also according to their expectations, the
(subjective) credibility of government announcements and the (objective)
sustainability of initiated policies is at the core of the discussion. Hence,
recommendations are controversial with respect to the speed of the
stabilization program, to additional measures apart from fiscal and
monetary restriction, and to the sequencing of stabilization and
liberalization.
The arguments in favour of a gradual approach are based on two
assumptions about structural impediments against a sudden and costless
disinflation (Dombusch, Simonsen, 1987; Fischer, 1981). First, an
economy which experienced a long period with high inflation may carry
the symptoms of "inflation inertia". In this setting, the short run process of
wage bargaining and price setting is characterized by backward-looking
inflation expectations, either through legal indexation mechanisms or
slowly adapting expectations. Information on incomes policy in Vietnam is
scarce, but it can be assumed that at least in the state sector wages have
been adjusted to a costs-of-living index at regular intervals. Hence, a
sudden restrictive policy would lead inevitably to an increase in real
wages, followed by unemployment and a significant fall of real production.
Second, even if the expectations of the population could be made more
forward-looking, the inflation inertia would not always disappear. If the
government has lost reputation in the past, any announcement of
persistent changes in the fiscal and monetary regime is not credible forthe public until the results of this change are clearly perceptible.
According to this view, only a gradual stabilization program could lead to
lower inflation without high adjustment costs, since there is time left for
expectations to be corrected and reputation to be built up.
The advocates of a shock approach argue that "gradualism invites
speculation about future reversals in policy" (Sargent, 1983, p. 94).
Hence, only an abrupt change in the policy regime could signal the
government's commitment to reform and result in low inflation rates
without a substantial fall in output (Sargent, 1982; Taylor, 1989). The in-
flation inertia of the past would disappear immediately, if the
institutionalized backward-looking indexation is abolished and the
credibility of the stabilization program is high enough. Moreover, the
public would be rnore likely to switch to low inflation expectations, the
more unstable the initial conditions are and the less it has accommodated
itself to inflation (Vegh, 1992). In case of a low government reputation, the
credibility can be enhanced by the creation of an independent central
bank and a simultaneous shift in the fiscal policy regime. In other words,
the strict adherence to the changed rules in itself creates the credibility
(Guidotti, Vegh, 1992). However, it remains debated whether additional
measures are apt to raise the credibility of a stabilization program, and
whether the costs of undesirable side-effects are higher than their benefits
(Dombusch, 1991).
For the advocates of a pure shock approach, credibility could only be
enhanced by the announcement of strict limits for the issue of currency,
significant fiscal reforms and external assistance such as rescheduling or
partial relief of external debt.
2 Additional measures would have only little
influence on expectations, since they are known to be temporary.
Conversely, the arguments in favour of additional measures are based on
the assumption that the credibility of any stabilization program is
influenced by several other factors apart from economic consistency.
First, the government often lacks reputation due to policy failures in the
past or announcements to which it didn't stick. For instance, the
Vietnamese government lost reputation due to the failure of the 1985
currency reform. Second, the reform program may be considered as
2 After the dissolution of the CMEA, Vietnam suffered from high foreign debt
service obligations and limited access to international capital markets.socially unbalanced, which causes the resistance of the respective
pressure groups. Third, the possibility of ex-post deviations from the
announced strategy ("cheating") may lead to adverse ex-ante changes in
the expectations of the public (Calvo, Vegh, 1991; Funke, 1991).
Accordingly, the adherents of gradualism recommend temporary price
stops and the fixing of the exchange rate. These measures (which are
commonly termed "heterodox", since they deviate from "orthodox" pleas
for flexible prices) could be used to enforce a sudden interruption of the
inflation inertia. A complete freeze of present prices and wages stops the
possibly existing inertial inflation of all domestically produced goods by
definition; the fixing or retarded devaluation of the (nominal) exchange
rate stabilizes the domestic prices of foreign goods, which indirectly
damps domestic inflation. Hence, the exchange rate could provide a
nominal anchor, if the monetary authority does not pursue an independent
monetary policy, i.e. if changes in national reserves are not sterilized by
the central bank (Edwards, 1992). Moreover, the exchange rate could be
a good indicator for the success or failure of the stabilization program,
which can easily and without delay be observed by the public in contrast
to the growth rate of money supply or the budget deficit. A fixed exchange
rate would signal a credible reform program since it can only be defended
if the government sticks to the announced austerity policy. In addition,
both measures could be interpreted as a temporary respite for a
government with low reputation to realize time-consuming fiscal and
monetary reforms (Kiguel, Liviatan, 1992). In the process of disinflation,
the collection of taxes usually increases in real terms, since the
inflationary losses of the public budget from delayed tax payments are
automatically shrinking (reversed Oliveira-Tanzi-effect).
Both price controls and a fixed exchange rate have their disadvantages
though. If the government doesn't take advantage of the "inflation-respite"
for significant fiscal and monetary reform steps, its credibility will shrink
and inflationary expectation will rise before the controls are lifted. Of
course, this is the more likely the more frequent the price stop has been
proven unsuccessful or unsustainable in the past. In countries like
Vietnam with large informal goods markets a comprehensive price stop is
probably not sustainable at all. In addition, wage bargaining and price
adjustments were probably not organized in the same time pattern across
industries. Hence the "frozen" structure of relative prices and wages
contains some arbitrariness adding to the price distortions resulting fromcentrl planning, which makes price adjustment necessary in the near
future (Blejer, Cheasty, 1987). These inefficiencies will be even larger if
international trade has been liberalized simultaneously, with the
consequence that foreign prices increasingly matter. At that point, a
gradualist would argue that these distortions "are far less costly than the
unemployment that would otherwise be needed to drive inflation down"
(Dornbusch, Fischer, 1986, p. 44).
The success of a fixed exchange rate is based on the assumption that the
government does not follow an independent monetary policy. If it does,
restrictions on imports or on capital account transactions would soon
become necessary to maintain an otherwise depreciating exchange rate.
Such interventions would lead to inefficiencies and hence are able to
undermine the credibility of the whole program. If credibility is actually
achieved, a real appreciation^may occur due to capital inflows which may
make necessary a correction of the fixed exchange rate (Calvo, Vegh,
1991). For this reason, a nominally fixed exchange rate is only useful, if it
has to a considerable extent been devaluated beforehand as a temporary
cushion against real overvaluation, or if a steady inflow of foreign capital
is to be expected (Edwards, 1992). By contrast, flexible exchange rates
are consistent with any change in the speed of monetary restriction.
In recent publications it has been argued that some special characteristics
of socialist economies in transition provide an argument for a gradual
stabilization with additional heterodox measures (e.g. Fischer, Gelb,
1990). First, one may expect a certain amount of repressed inflation due
to the monetary overhang of the past, which would become rampant as
soon as prices are liberalized. Second, the monetary restrictions
necessary for a shock approach could be counterproductive since
domestic capital markets are not sufficiently developed. Emerging private
enterprises would then have to carry the burden of high real interest rates
or rely solely on earned profits to finance their investments, whereas
public enterprises still have excess to preferential credits (Calvo, Coricelli,
1992). Third, the supply response after the liberalization of prices could
only be moderate due to the inflexibility of public enterprises. The con-
sistency of these arguments has been denied, however, on the basis of
both theoretical arguments and the first evidence from former centrally
planned economies. Due to the existence of seizable informal markets for
goods and foreign currency in Vietnam it is probably only the
underdeveloped domestic capital market that could be of some relevancein this respect. First, if there really was something like a monetary
overhang, than it should be erased by a confiscatory currency reform
before the stabilization program starts, or by a one-time increase in the
price level. But the larger the role of informal ("black") markets has been
in the former CPE, the less likely is the existence of such an inflationary
potential since consumers were able to bid higher prices according to
their preferences (Cochrane, Ickes, 1990). Second, the institutional
deficits of the capital markets are only a symptom of the political
obstacles against the abolition of credit preferences. Hence, they will not
be changed simply by following a gradual liberalization strategy. Third, the
supply response obviously not only depends on the reaction of public but
also of private enterprises. Therefore, the output shock can be expected
to be the smaller the more developed the entrepreneurial capacity of the
emerging private sector is and the less restrictions are imposed on it.
Whereas a large consensus exists that fiscal and monetary stabilization
should be granted high priority in any reform program, views on the
optimal sequence of stabilization and major liberalization steps differ. Of
special importance in this controversy is the sequencing of trade reforms
and of privatization of state-owned enterprises. Opponents to a
simultaneous implementation of stabilization and trade reform argue that
external trade would take place under wrong market signals as long as
high inflation distorts relative prices significantly (Fischer, Gelb, 1991).
Furthermore, in the case of a fixed exchange rate and assuming inertial
inflation, it is feared that an undesired real appreciation of the domestic
currency induces an unwarranted shift of resources to the sector which
produces nontradables (Rojas-Suarez, 1987). Both arguments probably
apply for gradual stabilization programs only. A third argument deals with
the availability of budget revenues from import duties. It is feared that the
budget reform is harder to sustain without these revenues, especially in
the beginning when other taxes are not yet fully collected (Blejer,
Cheasty, 1987). Hence, a gradual trade liberalization is recommended.
One has to remember, however, that the delay of any trade liberalization
measures would perpetuate the inefficiency arising from large differences
between domestic and international prices. As in all other socialist
countries, prices and quantities in the foreign trade of Vietnam have been
subject to central planning. Liberalizing external trade is the easiest way
to introduce competition, since domestic producers immediately face
world market prices (Krueger, 1981). The costs (in terms of output lossesand unemployment) of readjusting the production structure and increasing
productivity, which are then to be carried in an early reform phase, are
probably even larger in the case of a delayed trade reform. Moreover, the
credibility of the whole liberalization program can be enhanced by a rapid
trade reform. First, clear and understandable liberalization steps signal
the strong intention of the government to continue the reform process.
Second, the consumption standards are raised by imported goods, which
may somewhat compensate the population for the costs of adjustment.
Private ownership of firms is one of the key features of a market
economy. Although private ownership coexisted in Vietnam even after
the 1976 unification, state and collective ownership always received
special support. Yet, the sudden privatization of all state-owned
enterprises is hardly possible, even if basic rules and institutions are
already existing. Some authors argue that privatization should be
postponed until macroeconomic instability is achieved and major
distortions have been eliminated (e.g. Lipton, Sachs, 1990). Accordingly,
the informational content of relative prices, necessary for the calculation
of the market value of a firm to be privatized, is distorted under conditions
of macroeconomic instability. In addition, the behaviour of former state-
owned firms is changed only if the soft budget constraints, especially from
the banks, are hardened. This would require a basic institutional reform of
the banking sector. Taken at face value, this argument is similar to the
one discussed with respect to disinflation and can be turned around in a
similar way. The credibility of the reform program may even be supported
by early privatizations, starting with small enterprises (Fischer, Gelb,
1991). During the period of continued state intervention on goods and
credit markets in favour of state-owned enterprises, private firms could
rely on informal ("black") markets. Hence, even under distorted market
conditions, the private sector is able to realize new production
opportunities. If relative prices are distorted, this problem has to be faced
by any owner, public or private.
Summing up the controversies sketched in this section, the following
conclusions can be drawn.
3 First, the success of a shock approach in
terms of disinflation hinges on the institutional preconditions (stability-
oriented central bank, relatively well developed capital markets and a
For the empirical evidence see Bruno et al. (1991).competent fiscal administration), since a fiscal and monetary regime shift
is necessary to bring about the required change of inflation expectations
and to accomplish a rapid disinflation with restrictive policy. Conversely, if
institutional capacities are limited (either technically or politically) as in
many former CPEs a gradual approach may have advantages until the
institutional gap is filled. The danger is that such an approach may lead to
a postponement of institutional reforms.
Second, the success of a shock approach in terms of productions and
employment depends on the structural flexiblity of the economy, since the
stabilization will probably cause reallocations of resources by triggering a
change of relative prices. Under such conditions, a simultaneous
liberalization of domestic markets and external trade can even improve
the result. If this required flexibility does not exist, an inefficient allocation
of resources is unavoidable, either under a shock approach or a gradual
approach. ' ,
Third, all "heterodox" measures are suitable to break the possibly existing
inflation inertia temporarily since they provide a nominal anchor. Still, they
cannot be used as a substitute for necessary fiscal and monetary
restrictions. On the contrary, these measures may give the impression of
a time-inconsistent reform program since the public could be cheated, e.g.
by a sudden and unexpected devaluation.
Fourth, in any case credibility is to be achieved for the announced reform
program. Credibility can be enhanced by international trade liberalization
and rapid privatisation. Whether credibility is actually best build up by a
gradual or a shock approach (or variants thereof) remains an empirical
question.
3. The Vietnamese Stabilization Program: A Success Story
Since 1986 - under the Do'i Moi ("renovation") slogan of the VI. Congress
of the Communist Party - Vietnam has carried out a comprehensive
economic reform program (Ronnas, Sjoberg, 1990; Diehl, 1993). The
central planning system has to some extent been replaced by market
economy institutions, which has led to considerable productivity
increases, especially in the agricultural sector. In addition, the external
trade has been liberalized gradually. One of the most significant
achievements of the reform period has been the successful stabilization10
since 1989. The inflation was caused by persistently high budget deficits,
which were to a large part financed by currency issue (Table 1).
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(a) In Vietnamese statistics transfer roubles (TRb) of the CMEA are converted to
US-$ at parity.
Source:Official Vietnamese publications and international sources, cited in Diehl
(1993); Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 January 1993.
The announced stabilization package comprised a drastic cut in public
expenditures and a restrictive monetary policy, but no "heterodox"
elements. By contrast, prices have been liberalized almost completely in
early 1989 and wage indexation was not existent, at least not in the public
sector (Kolodko et al., 1992). Since late 1988 the multiple official11
early 1989 and wage indexation was not existent, at least not in the public
sector (Kolodko et al., 1992). Since late 1988 the multiple official
exchange rates have been sharply devaluated close to the black market
exchange rate, and the thereafter unified rate is rather flexible since
March 1989, although under supervision of the Central Bank. Hence, one
is tempted to conclude that Vietnam followed an orthodox shock approach
(Wood, 1990). However, this impression cannot be confirmed completely,
especially with respect to the fiscal reform component.
Traditionally, the State budget was dominated by investment expenditures
for public enterprises and subsidies on the expenditure side, and transfers
from public enterprises on the revenue side. Despite considerable inflows
oiexternal assistance from the USSR until 1990, a substantial proportion
of the resulting budget deficit had to be covered by currency issue. From
1988 onwards a number of measures were introduced which were aimed
at a more marketroriented budget. A number of taxes for households and
all types of enterprises were imposed, and public enterprises were
granted increased financial autonomy. A cut in budget expenditures has
not been realized until 1991. To some extent, this was due to the
unexpected high military expenditures for the demobilization of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989. But even the abolishment of
all subsidies, which has been announced by the government (Brabant,
1990), apparently has not led to a significant fall of public expenditures.
The budget deficit remained high and money creation continued until
1991 when expenditure cuts and increased revenues, especially from
domestic crude oil production, were realized.
The reform of the banking sector started in 1988 with the separation of the
former monobank into several specialized public banks and a central
bank, which is not yet able to perform a monetary policy independent of
the government. In early 1989, nominal interest rates were increased and
interest-bearing foreign exchange denominated bank deposits introduced,
which lead the public to a large one-time increase of money holdings
(Dang Due Dam et al., 1991). This provided a short term cushion against
the inflationary consequences of the inflation tax, since the budget deficit
could be financed in the single year 1989 by these additional voluntary
savings (Brabant, 1990). In addition, total outstanding bank credits to
public enterprises were already frozen in real terms in 1988, i.e. the new
disbursed credits were only to compensate for the inflationary losses
(Diehl, 1993). In the following years this measure was maintained, and12
the expansion of credits from the banking system to the enterprise sector
stayed behind the expansion of bank deposits. Hence, the impact of
monetary policy was clearly restrictive. Nevertheless, it is presumed, that
public enterprises still have access to preferential credits (Radke, 1992).
The most significant reform component additional to the stabilization
program was the external trade reform in conjunction with the abolishment
of the multiple exchange rate system. The state monopoly in external
trade has been gradually opened, and the state administration of export
and import prices was replaced by a system of ad-valorem tariffs. As a
result, exports almost doubled in 1989 compared to the previous year,
whereas imports continued to be strictly controlled to reach a more
balanced current account. Hence, it is not obvious to what extent import
competition already became effective, especially since certain domestic
industries are protected by import tariffs. Moreover, it is unknown to what
extent the Vietnamese government pursued an exchange rate target.
According to official statistics the nominal exchange rate depreciated in
1990 and 1991, but appreciated in 1992. Roughly compared to the retail
price index, the real exchange rate appreciated moderately since 1989
(Diehl, 1993). But instead of being caused by a government target, this
could simply be a result of the structural shift from CMEA trade partners
to other countries. Finally, the very liberal Law on Foreign Direct
Investment, which was codified in 1987, prompted the first encouraging
results in 1988/89, although none of these licensed projects had lead to
effective capital inflows before 1990.
Another part of the liberalization program should be mentioned in this
respect: the liberal business laws that are to be applied for all types of
ownership, including public enterprises. The codification of property laws,
contract laws, tax laws, etc. is meant to provide equal opportunities for the
hitherto discriminated private enterprise sector. Although the collection of
laws is not yet complete - a bankruptcy law is still in the legislative
process - productive resources have already become highly mobile. Em-
ployees of public enterprises have been laid off (Table 1) and many local
state enterprises have de facto been closed down or sold out to former
employees. However, the privatization of large public enterprises remains
one of the large problems which are still to be tackled.
Concerning the assumed special characteristics of socialist economies in
transition, for Vietnam probably two of them do not apply. First, there waso 13
obviously no repressed inflation since the private retail trade, which was
not subject to state-administered prices, had always had a high market
share (Table 2). Second, the supply response of the Vietnamese
economy was relatively quick, which can be attributed to the large
agricultural sector (about 40% of GDP) and the entrepreneurial capacity
of the private enterprise sector, especially in the South.



















































Source: General Statistical Office, 1992.
The only one of the above mentioned points that could probably be of
some relevance for Vietnam is the underdeveloped capital market, which
created new distortions when the restrictive monetary policy was
implemented. Private enterprises and cooperatives often claim to be
discriminated against by the large state banks. In addition, many of the
cooperative banks in rural areas are in a liquidity crisis since they do not
have full access to the Central Bank refinancing facilities (Seibel, 1992).
Hence, private enterprises often have to rely on earned profits or informal
finance agencies to finance their investment needs. The political will to
maintain credit preferences and other hidden subsidies for public
enterprises probably contributed to the delay of strict fiscal adjustments,
and probably even more so to a less elastic supply response than would
have been possible.
With regard to the conclusions drawn in the previous section, the rapid
success of the Vietnamese stabilization program leaves some open
questions: First, the institutional preconditions in 1989 were not the result
of a sudden significant regime shift, since fiscal discipline was not
enforced, and money creation to finance the budget deficit continued.
Second, factor mobility was de jure only limited, especially in the industrial14
sector. In practice, however, productive resources were to some extent
reallocated within the agricultural sector and between industries of the
private manufacturing sector. Third, no "heterodox" measures were used
to break a possibly existing inflation inertia. On the contrary, domestic
prices were liberalized and the exchange rate regime was changed from
fixed to floating. The fourth conclusion, stressing the need for credibility
enhancing measures, is the only one which directly applies to the
Vietnamese reform program.
It remains to be explained, however, through which mechanism the belief
in a successful stabilization has been created in spite of the postponed
fiscal adjustment. This belief must have been strong in 1989, since
otherwise the voluntary money holdings would not have increased. In the
next section, it will be shown how the floating of the exchange rate,
internal and external price liberalization and the codification of business
laws can best be understood as credibility enhancing measures which
made possible the switch from a high to a low inflation equilibrium,
although the monetization of the budget didn't change that much. The key
parameters in such a setting are liberalization measures which can be
shown to increase the output elasticity thus stabilizing the low-inflation
steady state.
4. Dual Equilibria in a Monetary Model of Hyperinflation
The recent experience of Vietnam seems to suggest that the existence of
multiple equilibria possesses some empirical relevance, especially in the
course of economic transformation. If there exist two ore more equilibrium
states in an economy, it is almost self-evident that the impact of the
credibility issues is especially large. In such a setting, the expectations of
the public are the most important factor in determining the final outcome.
It can be shown with a simple monetary model that a given amount of
seignorage revenue can be collected at either a high or a low rate of infla-
tion. This framework has been used inter alia by Sargent and Wallace
(1973), Evans and Yarrow (1981), Dombusch and Fischer (1986), Kiguel
(1989), and Bruno and Fischer (1990) with different assumptions on the
formation of inflation expectations and the adjustment process of output
and real balances. The crucial point for economic policy analysis within
this class of inflation models is the stability of the steady states.15
In the basic model a closed economy with constant output Y is con-
sidered, in which money is the only source of budget deficit financing.
Following Cagan (1956), the demand for real balances M
D IP is assumed
to be a function of the expected rate of inflation n
e:
(1) M?_ ^
Accordingly, private agents reduce their money holdings in real terms if
they expect inflation to rise, since the opportunity costs of holding non-
interest bearing assets are increasing. The parameter a denotes the
inflation elasticity of money demand.
The government budget constraint (with a dot above the variable for the
derivative with respect to time) here implies:
(2) M;=d-Y-Pt
where d-Y equals the real budget deficit and d, the budget deficit as a
fraction of output, is assumed to be constant. Combining (1) and (2) with





which is shown in Figure 1 as the upward bending curve BC + MD. This
curve represents a trade-off between inflation expectations and money
growth: the higher the
inflation expectations, the higher the money growth rate required to
finance a given deficit. Due to the assumption of instantaneously
adjusting real balances and the strict budget constraint, the economy is
always moving along this curve. Note that the intercept on the ju-axis
equals the chosen budget deficit as a fraction of output (see (3)).
The equilibria of this system are characterized by the steady state
conditions:
(4) 7T = 7T
e = const.;— = const.









According to (5), inflation expectations n" remain constant (and therefore
are identical to actual inflation n) only if money growth 11 equals inflation
n, that is if real money holdings remain constant. Hence, the steady state
conditions are simultaneously fulfilled along the 45°-line in Figure 1,
where /i equals K'=K. There exist always two steady states on the
BC + MD locus, as long as d does not exceed a certain level d
m" (which is
a function of a). The same fraction d of seignorage revenue may be
obtained at either a low or a high rate of inflation. This is a consequence
of the functional form of the money demand (1) which leads to a convex
form of the BC + MD schedule.
4 If the government increases the
seignorage fraction d, the BC + MD curve shifts upwards. The low
equilibrium inflation rate increases and the higher one decreases, as can
be seen from Figure 1. At the maximum level for d, the two equilibria fall
together in one point, and above that level no steady state exists.
At this point the question arises how the economy adjusts to a change of
the seignorage level, and whether the new steady state will always be
reached. To analyze the stability of the two equilibria, the adjustment of
inflation expectations has to be specified. Assuming adaptive
expectations it follows that:
(6) n'=p(n^7c'},p>0
Accordingly, the expected rate of inflation is corrected upwards, if the
present inflation has been underestimated, depending on the speed
parameter p. The case of rational expectations can be treated as the limit
case of an increasing adjustment speed (/3->°°). From (5) and (6) one
obtains the differential equation for n'\
<7> ^ v*-)
where m is determined by (3). For all points below the 45° line \i<n
e
holds. From (7) it follows that n
e<Q below the 45° line if ap <\, i.e. if the
adjustment speed (3 of inflation expectations or the inflation elasticity a of
money demand are relatively low. Figure 1 shows, that the economy
The . same characteristic holds for a money demand function
M
D/P = Y-(i + 7r
c)~
a,a>i, which has been proposed e.g. by Bernholz and
Jacksch (1989).18
converges to the low inflation equilibrium if it starts in the vicinity of that
point. Under the same assumptions about a and (5 one gets from (7) that
K
C rises above the 45° line (/j.>n
e). Hence, points on the MD + BC schedule
above the high equilibrium reflect situations, where the government prints
money at an ever increasing rate. In such a situation, no adjustment to a
steady state takes place and expectations never catch up to actual
inflation.
The stability properties are reversed, when p is sufficiently large {ab>\). In
particular,^ with instantaneously adjusting expectations only the high
inflation equilibrium is stable, since one gets from (7) by letting fi->°°:
The alternative interpretations considered so far refer only to different
adjustment speeds of inflation expectations. With slowly adapting
expectations (low p) there is a gradual adjustment to a stable low inflation
equilibrium. With fastly adapting expectations (high p) there is an
adjustment towards the high inflation equilibrium whereas the low inflation
equilibrium is unstable. This distinction has ignored the possibility of
jumps from one equilibrium to another which are possible under rational
expectations (Bruno, Fischer, 1990). Accordingly, the low level equilibrium
can be achieved even under rational expectations, if only the public is
made to believe that there is a permanent shift in government policy
towards economic stability. This result is the analytical foundation of the
arguments in favor of the shock-approach. In case of high credibility, the
necessary fiscal adjustments may even be delayed. The jump of expected
and actual rates of inflation to the low equilibrium will not reduce inflation
to zero, but a significant step in disinflation can be achieved. In this
situation, the low level equilibrium is not a stable one, however (see
Figure 2). Any deviation from announcements of significant policy
changes, that have made possible the downwards jump, will lead to fast
return back to the high inflation equilibrium. Once again, this line of
reasoning points to the question by what means the government can en-
hance its credibility.19







One way to improve the stability properties of the low inflation equilibrium
is to extend the model by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function,
5 which
allows for variable output and employment. Equation (8) describes how
output is influenced by inflation expectations:
(8) y = 7-{7c-K
c},y>0
Accordingly, real wages are decreasing in case of an unanticipated rise of
inflation {n>n
e) since nominal wages are increased in line with inflation
expectations, whiclvhas a positive impact on aggregate supply. With this
variable output function (5) changes to (5'):
(5') - n-n-y = -aK*





From (7") it can be seen that the positive output reaction has a stabilizing
effect
6 on the low inflation equilibrium, since the stability condition now
only requires a/} <-(i + y). The larger the real wage elasticity y of
aggregate supply, the more likely the economy can be kept in the low
inflation equilibrium. This allows to identify one channel through which the
low inflation expectations can be stabilized once they have been
decreased in a sudden jump: measures such as internal and external lib-
eralizations which are able to improve supply conditions are stabilizing the
low steady state by increasing the output elasticity y.
5. Conclusions
It seems fair to call Vietnam's reform program a gradual liberalization
approach with important shock elements in the liberalization components.
Lucas (1972); here the dynamic form is used, i.e. after differentiating with
respect to time.
The stabilizing effect changes the dynamics only in the case of adaptive
expectations. But, as Sargent and Wallace (1973) have noted, in the
presence of feedback from inflation to subsequent rates of money creation
adaptive expectations can be fully rational.21
The stabilization was based on immediate monetary restrictions, whereas
the budget deficit has not been reduced immediately. Especially the
simultaneous liberalization of international trade and the promotion of the
private enterprise sector have been important contributions to the
credibility of the stabilization. As a result of these measures, output and
employment losses in the adjustment period since 1989 have been
avoided (Table 1).
The dual equilibria monetary model of inflation provides the opportunity to
explain the success of such a stabilization-cum-liberalization program
which does not comprise an immediate fiscal adjustment component. The
credibility issue is at the core of the argument. The model has identified
one explicit channel through which the low inflation steady state can be
maintained after the "jump" of inflation expectations, namely the
improvement of supply flexibility. This supports the hypothesis that liber-
alization measures should be performed in an early stage of the
transformation process to avoid a long lasting stabilization crisis.
The case of Vietnam provides an empirical example, and hence supports
the hypothesis that a sudden decrease of inflation rates can be achieved
without "heterodox" measures. To the contrary, the abolition of price and
wage controls, promotion of the private sector and the liberalization of
international trade stabilized the Vietnamese economy and helped to
avoid losses in production and employment during the transformation
process. Even in the adjustment period the Vietnamese economy
experienced output and employment gains.
Finally, the analysis of the model leads to the prediction that future
increase of the budget deficit in Vietnam will seriously undermine the
relative stabilization success achieved so far. With rational expectations,
the low inflation equilibrium can only be maintained if the government
policy does not lead to doubts about the irreversibility of the reform
process. In this setting, a relatively small increase of the budget deficit, a
growing discrimination of the private sector or a withdrawal of internal and
external trade reform would lead to a sudden jump back to the high
inflation equilibrium.22
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